## 1NC

## 1

### t- business practices

#### Interpretation--business practices are activities done by for-profit firms

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| --- | --- |
| Farlex | Business Practice. (n.d.) *Farlex Financial Dictionary*. (2009). Retrieved February 6 2022 from <https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Business+Practice> |

Any tactic or [activity](https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/activity) a business conducts to reach its objectives. Ultimately, a business's objective is to make [money](https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/money). Business practices are the ways it attempts to do so in the most cost effective way. A company may have rules for business practices to ensure that its [employees](https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/employee) are efficient in their work and abide by applicable laws. See also: [Business ethics](https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/business+ethics).

#### Violation—the match program is a non-profit

The National Resident Matching Program® (NRMP®), or The Match®, is a private, non-profit organization established in 1952 at the request of medical students to provide an orderly and fair mechanism for matching the preferences of applicants for U.S. residency positions with the preferences of residency program directors.

#### Vote neg—

#### Precision—they haven’t met their burden to affirm a topical plan

#### Ground—kills core neg generics which assume the aff applies to businesses

#### Limits—jettisoning topic words allows for infinite affs that are in the direction of the topic

## 2

### T – core

#### Expansions to ‘core antitrust laws’ must apply economy wide---they don’t.

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

#### Vote neg for limits—endless number of sectors make case negs impossible.

## 2

#### The United State federal government should

#### Eliminate the National Resident Matching Program

#### Prohibit any future graduate resident matching programs

#### Maintain the current scope of its core antitrust laws

## 3

#### The United States federal government should do the plan’s antitrust expansion as a regulation on the Match Program:

#### Regulations solve the aff and avoid antitrust DAs---CP’s more predictable and enforceable

Shelanski 18 [Howard Shelanski, Professor of Law, Georgetown University; Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, “COMMENT: Antitrust and Deregulation,” 127 Yale L.J. 1922, 1926-1960, May, 2018, lexis]

Antitrust is not, however, the only institution through which government addresses competition concerns and market failures. Congress can give regulatory agencies authority to intervene where they see the need to address competition and market structure--and Congress has often done so. With such statutory authority, "[i]n effect, the agency becomes a limited-jurisdiction enforcer of antitrust principles." 16 For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has jurisdiction to approve transfers of routes between airlines carriers, giving it a role in reviewing airline mergers. 17 The 1992 Cable Act gave the FCC authority [\*1927] to limit the share of the national cable market that a single operator could serve, thereby giving the agency some control over the industry's market structure. 18 The FCC has long regulated market entry and, through its control over license transfers, reviewed mergers and acquisitions in several sectors of the telecommunications industry. More recently, the FCC issued, 19 and then repealed, 20 "network neutrality" regulations intended to preserve ease of entry and a level playing field for digital services. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Energy, and numerous other federal agencies have various powers that directly affect competition. 21 State regulation can be important as well in governing competition, particularly in the insurance and healthcare industries. 22

In contrast to the case-by-case approach of antitrust, regulation typically imposes ex ante prohibitions or requirements on business conduct. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, required incumbent local telephone companies to grant new competitors access to parts of their networks and prohibited incumbents from refusing to interconnect calls from their customers to customers of competing networks. 23 With the rule in place, the FCC bore no burden of proving that a specific instance of network access was necessary for competition, or that a specific denial of interconnection would harm competition. In contrast [\*1928] to antitrust, where the burden of proving liability is on the agency, under a regulatory regime the burden of seeking a waiver from regulation or challenging an agency's enforcement decision is usually on the regulated party.

Antitrust and regulation therefore present alternative approaches to governing competition and addressing market failures. 24 The government can review individual mergers under the antitrust laws, as it does in most markets, or it can set rules that impose clear, ex ante limits on the extent of concentration, as the FCC did for media ownership under the Communications Act. 25 Government can investigate under the antitrust laws whether a firm has monopoly power that it has "willful[ly]" acquired or maintained other than "as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 26 Alternatively, with authority from Congress an agency can regulate how much of a market a single firm can serve, as the FCC tried to do with cable companies, 27 or require firms to dispose of key assets in order to promote competition in a relevant market, as the DOT has done with airline slots. 28

## 4

#### The United States federal government should implement an early result acceptance program to allow students to apply to a maximum of 5 programs with an early acceptance process.

**Hammoud 20**: Maya M. Hammoud, Md,, 1-28-2020, "Improving the Residency Application and Selection Process—An Optional Early Result Acceptance Program," Jama Network, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2759409

The process of securing a residency position following medical school has become increasingly arduous and complicated. The mean number of applications per applicant for US and Canadian medical school graduates has increased across all specialties in the last decade, with several specialties seeing a doubling in number of applications. For instance, from 2011 to 2019, applications per applicant increased from 15.2 to 34.8 for family medicine, from 30.5 to 61.3 for obstetrics and gynecology, and from 21.6 to 51.9 for psychiatry.1 Similarly, the number of applications received by each program also has increased across all specialties, some by more than 200%. For example, from 2011 to 2019, the mean number of applications received by family medicine programs increased from 76 to 251 and received by psychiatry programs increased from 115 to 446.1 A cycle involving increased numbers of applications and increased reliance on standardized testing has resulted in behavioral changes in both applicants and residency programs. Currently, senior medical students spend large amounts of time and money during the last year of medical school applying to an increasing number of programs and meeting the demands of the residency application process. Yet, in 2019, even though the ratio of first-year positions available per active US senior medical student was 1.7 (32 194 positions offered to 18 925 US applicants), the highest on record, the percentage of all US senior medical students who matched to their first-choice programs was 47.1%, the lowest on record (down from 52.6% in 2011). Furthermore, 5.8% of students did not match, an increase from 5.2% in 2011, and more than 20% of students matched to a program they ranked fourth or lower on their list.2 Meanwhile, to process the high volume of applications received, programs are likely relying more on quantitative metrics, such as United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) Step 1 scores, for screening. Results of the 2018 National Resident Matching Program’s Program Director Survey showed that 94% of residency programs cited the USMLE Step 1 score/COMLEX Level 1 score as an important factor in selecting applicants to interview, an increase from 73% in 2012.3 Moreover, some programs report using minimum USMLE Step 1 scores when screening applications in an effort to reduce the number of applications to be reviewed. For example, 83% (89 of 107) of the 151 orthopedic surgery programs that responded to a survey reported use of a USMLE Step 1 minimum score when screening applications, and 53% of programs reported requiring a score greater than 230.4 Whether this is true for all applicants, or some, is unknown. The increased relevance of Step 1 in screening applications can be detrimental to applicants and residency programs. First, overreliance on USMLE Step 1 may have particularly negative consequences for students underrepresented in medicine, who historically have achieved lower scores on these examinations. Hierarchical linear modeling of USMLE Step 1 scores between 2010 and 2015 demonstrated that self-identified black students scored 16 points lower than white students.5 Second, reliance on Step 1 scores may cause medical students to focus on preparation for Step 1 at the expense of focusing on other important aspects of their education. Third, relying on test scores as screening criteria is antithetical to finding the right resident for the right program, as program directors might miss out on students with qualities that align well with the mission of their programs. To address the unintended consequences of use of the USMLE Step 1 score, the USMLE parent organizations (the Federation of State Medical Boards and the National Board of Medical Examiners), along with the American Medical Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, convened an invitational conference including members of each organization with additional members representing a broad spectrum of medical education, state medical boards, examinees, and the public to discuss the complex issue of USMLE score use and to explore possible modifications to USMLE scoring.6 The large number of applications submitted to residency programs was identified as a major challenge, and the discussions highlighted a pressing need to improve the quality of information transmitted in the application package as well as a need for increased transparency from programs about the key characteristics they value in applicants. This information may not reduce the number of applications submitted because of the perceived disadvantage to individuals who apply to fewer programs. An alternative approach, imposing a random cap on the number of applications an applicant may submit, might give an unfair advantage to more competitive applicants. Therefore, this problem will continue unless a strategy is developed to change the approach to the resident selection process. A new approach to help decrease the number of applications by **giving students the option of an early application and expeditious result match program may be helpful**. One possible approach might be an early result acceptance program (ERAP), in which students would be permitted to apply to a maximum of 5 programs, and programs would be limited to filling half of all their available spots. Match results could be available several months prior to the current match, and students who enter the ERAP and do not match could join the regular match. Medical students would not need to reinterview with programs to which they applied in the ERAP and could still be eligible for ranking those programs in the regular match. The interview cycle for the ERAP would need to start earlier than the current cycle, or the current cycle would need to be shortened to accommodate 2 matches. Both of these options pose challenges. Moving the cycle earlier will require applications, letters of recommendations, and away rotations to be completed earlier. This may not be possible for some students. In addition, shortening the regular cycle might be difficult for large residency programs unless a large percentage of students opt for the early match and program directors fill many of their slots early.

#### CP solves – increases the number of IMGs, increases diversity in the application process, allows for effective processing of applications and ensures equitable and fair review.

**Hammoud 20**: Maya M. Hammoud, Md,, 1-28-2020, "Improving the Residency Application and Selection Process—An Optional Early Result Acceptance Program," Jama Network, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2759409

Nonetheless, an ERAP could help decrease the number of applications and potentially address the shortcomings of the current approach to matching for residency positions, and could help achieve a better fit between student and program as follows: First, fewer applications to programs at this phase could potentially permit program directors to spend more time reviewing applications to find individuals who are a good fit for the program based on multiple attributes, not just test scores. More comprehensive reviews may help increase diversity across specialties, especially those requiring higher USMLE Step 1 scores, as students who are underrepresented in medicine could have more opportunity to highlight their unique accomplishments and skills to the programs to which they apply. Second, deemphasizing USMLE Step 1 scores, which hopefully will occur, may allow medical students to focus on their own learning rather than on preparation for Step 1 examinations at the expense of professional development. Third, reducing the number of applications may help students focus on programs they are truly interested in and could serve to reduce the financial burden by decreasing application and interview travel costs. This could especially be of value to students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. However, limiting the number of applications through an early match may have several challenges that would need to be addressed. These include transparency between students and programs for optimal choices, ability of medical schools to transmit student information early to programs, and participation of all programs within a specialty. The ERAP would be similar in principle to early decision college admissions, where similar issues arise. The early decision option in which a student applies early to the top college of his or her choice and, if accepted, is bound to attend that college helps colleges decipher which applicants are genuinely interested in matriculating at their institutions. One of the major criticisms for college early decision admission is that it may negatively affect students in greater need of financial aid who have to explore financial aid packages from multiple schools before committing to attend, which benefits applicants with a stronger socioeconomic background.7 This is a clear distinction from the proposed ERAP, which could provide the benefits seen in college early decision programs (fewer applications and perhaps less stress) without the arguable financial bias present in college early decision. It may aid students with greater financial need, as it will decrease the cost of applications, travel, and interviews. The proposed ERAP option could have the potential to appeal to many types of students, including (1) highly competitive students with clear program preferences; (2) less competitive students who are concerned they may not match because of a lack of distinction in a large pool of applicants; (3) students constrained to a particular geographic area because of personal, family, or other factors; and (4) international medical graduates (IMGs) who have unique accomplishments, who are targeting programs in underserved settings that traditionally have high IMG acceptance rates, or both. Highly competitive medical students applying to a limited number of programs may help create a fairer distribution of interviews to other students who may be more interested in the same programs. For less competitive students and for IMGs, the proposed ERAP could result in a significant decrease in the number of applications submitted because these groups tends to submit a very high number of applications, often to more than one specialty. For applicants who are limited geographically, the ERAP may provide relief from uncertainty about where they will match and consequences to their families and significant others. The current residency application process should change to reduce the emotional and financial burden on medical students. Securing a residency position to continue training should not be as arduous and complicated as the current process appears to be. An ERAP has the potential to address many of the shortcomings of the current system and could potentially improve the fit between applicants and residency programs. If successful, the proposed ERAP could effectively limit, by student choice, the number of applications per student and per program, thus making the application process more tolerable and advantageous to all involved with the residency selection process.

## 4

#### Staffing and budget problems are created if antitrust litigation is applied – the Match is the most efficient program

**[Creassman 03**] Creassman, Melinda, Volume 56, Issue5, Vanderbilt Law Review, https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1767&context=vlr

A restricted free labor market suggests, however, that some aspects of the NRMP may be appropriate in the resident placement context. While a market-based system would theoretically increase the fair market value of resident services and would comport with antitrust law, at least four significant concerns overshadow the potential benefits of the free market approach. First, even in an open market, residents may have little real ability to negotiate employment contracts. As with many jobs, the terms of employment may be effectively fixed for all candidates. Second, the institution of a free labor market would circumvent the purpose behind the NRMP. An important benefit of the Match is its efficient, organized selection process in which all parties submit and receive placement preferences at the same time.188 In a free labor 182. Blumstein, supra note 163, at 32. 183. Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 4; Davis, supra note 144. 184. See Nat'l Resident Matching Program, supra note 9, at 2 (describing the "chaos" of the pre-Match era). 185. See Blumstein, supra note 163, at 32. 186. Id. 187. See Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement, History (stating that NALP was founded in response "to a perceived need by many law schools and legal employers for a common forum to discuss issues involving placement and recruitment"), at http://www.nalp.org/about/history.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2003). Virtually all American Bar Association-accredited law schools and many of the nation's legal employers voluntarily comply with the NALP guidelines. See Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement, Principles and Standards, at http://www.nalp.org/pands/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2003). 188. See supra Part II.B. 1468 [Vol. 56:1439 2003] IMPROVING MEDICAL RESIDENT PLACEMENT market, residency programs would likely spend more time and money recruiting medical students since the placement burden would shift from the externally operated NRMP onto the internal resources of individual hospitals. Higher costs associated with recruiting activities are an attendant evil of the free market employment process. Third, a market-based system creates the possibility that a residency program will receive more acceptances than it can accommodate. This is a daunting prospect for programs, which have strict budgeting and staffing needs. In a free labor market, hospitals would invariably risk under- or overstaffing. While most employers face this dilemma in the recruiting process, in a hospital setting patient care is tied to physician staffing. Simply put, hospitals are the last places where society wants unpredictable staffing. Finally, a free labor market would introduce politics into the resident placement process. The NRMP was designed, in part, to foster merit-driven competition by creating a non-political placement mechanism.18 9 The increased presence of politics in resident hiring could lead to inferior patient care if resident positions were no longer awarded solely on the basis of merit. Assuming that the NRMP does, in fact, minimize the influence of politics, completely abandoning the current system may not provide an optimal solution

#### C/A their Diamond ev - Omicron has caused staffing shortages, and Goldberg ev

#### Straight turns their first adv

## 4

### FTC DA

#### The FTC will enforce ‘right to repair’ now---it spurs growth and innovation, particularly in agriculture.

Minter ’21 [Adam; July 11; Columnist and author; Bloomberg, “Americans Must Reclaim Their Right to Repair,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-07-11/americans-must-reclaim-their-right-to-repair>]

When the Apple II personal computer was shipped in 1977, it came with a [detailed manual](https://archive.org/details/Apple_II_Mini_Manual/page/n49/mode/2up) for upgrading and repairing the device. Parts were readily available from Apple Inc. (and, later, other manufacturers), and if Apple owners didn’t want to fix or upgrade at home, they could find plenty of small, competitive repair businesses to do the work for them.

That was then. These days, Apple’s products arrive sealed shut, often with [proprietary screws](https://www.ifixit.com/News/9905/bit-history-the-pentalobe). Service manuals, circuit-board schematics and repair parts are [reserved](https://www.ifixit.com/News/43179/apple-endangers-our-business-model-gets-a-repairability-point-for-it) for Apple’s technicians, shops and a handful of “authorized” partners. With no access to parts, manuals or indie repair shops, consumers pay much more to keep their devices running.

President Joe Biden’s new executive order to promote competition encourages the Federal Trade Commission to end such anti-competitive repair monopolies. It’s a contentious move. Apple and the makers of other technological products from farm tractors to [35mm cameras](https://www.ifixit.com/News/1349/how-nikon-is-killing-camera-repair) argue that their repair monopolies are good for consumers. But as these monopolies have grown, their toll on consumers, the environment and American productivity and innovation has risen. Biden’s recognition of a “right to repair” can help lower these costs and, at the same time, spur new kinds of growth across the economy.

Repair has always been a part of American life. The first prairie farmers had no option but to repair their own carts and plows. When mechanization came along, farmers became expert technicians — so skilled that companies often consulted them on tractor designs. During the past 15 years, as computers have been integrated into expensive farm equipment, that relationship has broken down. The handful of remaining implement manufacturers make sure that only dealerships, with specialized software tools, can diagnose problems. Those same tools are often also needed to install parts and authorize repairs.

The costs to farmers can be significant. Paying a Deere & Co dealership to plug in a computer to clear an error code on a tractor or combine can cost [hundreds of dollars](https://www.vice.com/en/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware) — not including transporting the tractor to the dealership. Worse, by limiting access to crucial diagnostic and repair tools, manufacturers cause significant delays during harvest, planting and other busy periods. At certain times, a piece of equipment immobilized for even a few hours can cost a farmer thousands of dollars.

As farmers lose money, farm manufacturers with parts and service businesses [profit handsomely](https://uspirg.org/feature/usp/deere-headlights). From 2013 to 2019, Deere & Co annual sales of new equipment declined 19%, to $23.7 billion, while sales of parts increased 22%, to $6.7 billion. Harvester manufacturers aren’t the only ones who’ve spotted a growth market in restricting access to repair. In 2019, Apple’s Tim Cook [conceded](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/01/letter-from-tim-cook-to-apple-investors/) that lower-cost iPhone battery replacements had negatively impacted new iPhone sales. More expensive repairs, on the other hand, lead customers to think they may as well buy a new phone.

That’s bad for the buyers of Apple’s expensive new phones and even worse for lower-income consumers who rely on secondhand devices. Lack of competition in repair markets raises the cost of owning older devices, and ultimately accelerates their untimely, wasteful disposal.

The first calls to roll back manufacturer restrictions on repair, in the early 2010s, were focused on cars. But the problem now encompasses everything from phones to farm equipment. Since 2014, [32 states](https://www.repair.org/legislation) have considered so-called Fair Repair bills. Earlier this year, the New York legislature became the [first](https://states.repair.org/states/newyork/) to pass one.

But manufacturers have pushed hard to defeat such legislation. In 2017, Apple warned Nebraska lawmakers that Fair Repair “would make it very easy for hackers to relocate to Nebraska.” [TechNet](http://technet.org/), a trade group that represents Apple, Amazon Inc. and Google, has [warned](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-20/microsoft-and-apple-wage-war-on-gadget-right-to-repair-laws) several states that Fair Repair legislation would somehow jeopardize the safety of devices. (TechNet did not respond to requests for examples of such consumer safety threats.)

The federal government has not bought these arguments. In May, the Federal Trade Commission [reported](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/05/nixing-fix-report-explores-consumer-repair-issues) that “many of the explanations manufacturers gave for repair restrictions aren’t well-founded.” Biden’s executive order now encourages the FTC to “limit powerful equipment manufacturers from restricting people’s ability to use independent repair shops or do DIY repairs.”

#### The plan trades off.

Nylen ’20 [Leah; December 10; Antitrust journalist; Politico, “FTC suffering a cash crunch as it prepares to battle Facebook,” <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftc-cash-facebook-lawsuit-444468>]

The agency that just launched a landmark antitrust suit to break up Facebook is so strapped for cash that its leaders have discussed shrinking their staff and warned against taking on more cases.

In a series of emails to all Federal Trade Commission staff, obtained by POLITICO, Executive Director David Robbins said the agency would face a period of “belt tightening” to cut costs — and that filing fewer cases and trimming litigation expenses must be on the table.

“[W]e will either need to bring fewer expert intensive cases or significantly decrease our litigation costs (e.g. experts, transcripts, litigation support contractors, etc.),” Robbins said in an Oct. 29 email.

The emails offer an increasingly dire portrait of the money woes facing the FTC, which has launched a record amount of litigation in the past year even as the pandemic has caused a sharp reduction in the corporate merger filing fees that normally supply about half its budget. The crunch also raises the possibility that the FTC may not have the cash it needs to win its case against Facebook, which is gearing up for an expensive fight, or to take on additional companies like Amazon.

#### Extinction.

Castellaw ’18 [John; March 14; Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corps, member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board, teaching fellow in the College of Business and Global Affairs at the University of Tennessee; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Why Food Security Matters,” <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031418_Castellaw_Testimony.pdf>]

Food Security Is Critical to Our National Security

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be nuanced and comprehensive, employing “hard” as well as “soft” power in a National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power, including a Food Security Strategy.

An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings.

These conclusions are based on my decades of experience while serving as a Marine around the world and from a lifetime as a steward of the soil on my family farm in Tennessee. I see food security strategy in military terms as either being “defensive” or “offensive”. “Defensive” includes those actions we take to protect our agricultural infrastructure including crops, livestock and the food chain here in the United States. Conversely, the “Offensive” side of food security takes the initiative to deal with food security issues overseas and this is where I will spend most of my time today.

There is a good reason for our success on the “defensive” here at home in ensuring our own food security. As my good friend and former Tennessee Deputy Agriculture Commissioner Louis Buck points out to me, American agriculture has always been about public/private enterprise. The Morrill Act of 1862 – showing our Country’s foresight and confidence in the future even in the dark days of our Civil War – created our Land Grant University model of teaching, research and extension. And equally importantly, we have a private sector that values individual initiative, unleashing an unparalleled vitality. With that vitality driving innovation, our farmers and ranchers leverage the expertise and information from the public sector to manage risks and seek profits from deployed capital. But above all, American farmers and ranchers are our “citizen soldiers” on the front lines here at home fighting to guarantee our food security.

America is also blessed with fertile soil, water availability, moderate climate, and the advanced technology to successfully utilize our abundance. Whether I walk the corn fields of Indiana or the cotton fields of Tennessee, I see agricultural technology in use that is amazing. Soon after I retired from the Marines and came home to the family farm, I climbed into the cab of a self-propelled sprayer. Settling into the seat was like strapping into the cockpit of one of the aircraft I flew, except the sprayer had more computing power and better data links. All these factors, public and private, natural and manmade, hard work and innovation, combine to provide the American people with the widest choices in the world of wholesome foods to eat and clothes to wear.

## 5

### Bizcon DA

#### Growth will rebound due to self-sustaining corporate performance.

Van der Welle ’21 [Peter; July 7; Strategist within the Global Macro team, M.A. in Economics from Tilburg University; Robeco, “How capex holds the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery,” <https://www.robeco.com/latam/en/insights/2021/07/how-capex-holds-the-key-to-a-self-sustaining-economic-recovery.html>]

Title:

How capex holds the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery.

Capital expenditure to fix supply shortages and meet burgeoning demand is seen figuring strongly in the post-Covid recovery.

[Author and summary omitted].

Companies are expected to invest heavily in new equipment and capacity as they seek to meet the pent-up demand released from economic reopening.

“The world is emerging from the pandemic, and much of the focus has been on the release of huge pent-up demand for goods and services that have been inaccessible for much of the past year,” says Peter Van der Welle, strategist with Robeco’s multi-asset team.

“But there is a bigger issue regarding the ability of companies to supply these goods and services, due to the supply side constraints that have emerged through economic reopening. We believe this is powering a resurgence in capital expenditure by companies, and those which are investing in new equipment to meet greater demand will be the more sought after stocks.”

Capex intentions

Van der Welle says this trend can already be seen in the US Federal Reserve’s Capex Intentions Index, which shows that steep year-on-year increases in capital expenditures are planned.

“So, that's promising for a near-term rebound in the capex cycle,” he says. “The market has already picked up on that theme because you can see a clear outperformance of capex-intensive stocks compared to the broader market year to date.”

Fiscal dominance

Van der Welle says five elements support the multi-asset team’s view that capex will rise from here onwards. “The first is the overarching macroeconomic picture in that we are increasingly moving towards an environment of fiscal dominance and away from one that has been monetary-led via quantitative easing,” he says.

“Central banks have pursued very easy monetary policies, but they have hit the nominal lower bounds with regard to policy rates.”

“This is a hard constraint because real rates are difficult for central banks to push even lower than they are nowadays, given the strong consensus among both central bankers and market participants that inflation is transitory.”

Big spending plans

For stimulus, fiscal policy is better suited to address the negative supply shock that Covid-19 has posed. Fiscal dominance can be seen in the huge infrastructure spending planned in the US, with the USD 1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan already in motion, and the USD 2 trillion American Jobs Plan going through Congress. In Europe, the disbursement of the EUR 750 billion EU Recovery Fund is due to start later in July.

“An era of fiscal dominance is able to say goodbye to the secular stagnation thesis, which holds that the economy is suffering from under-investment,” says Van der Welle. “Under-investment due to insufficient demand, which was the biggest problem after the global financial crisis, has become less likely.”

“We saw very subdued consumption growth both in the US and elsewhere between 2009 and 2019. That story is reversing in the US. Households’ income has been supported by fiscal policy during the Covid-19 recession, while burgeoning consumer demand in the reopening phase could prove to be more sticky as employment prospects continue to improve in the medium term.”

Tobin’s Q looks good

A third reason to expect higher capex is driven by ‘Tobin’s Q’ – the market value of a company divided by its assets' replacement cost. If this ratio is above one, then corporates have an incentive to invest directly in the underlying assets rather than buying another company at market value to acquire the same assets.

The Tobin’s Q ratio is currently at 1.7 for the US. “So it's very expensive to do M&A, and it is wiser for corporates to invest in the underlying capital goods themselves,” Van der Welle says.

“We should therefore expect a gradual move away from M&A activity towards companies making direct investments in capital goods.”

Supply-side constraints

The fourth element is the severe supply-side constraints seen in the global economy, as capacity shut down during the pandemic.

“This is reflected in the ISM Prices Paid Index, which reached an all-time high in June in reflection of rampant shortages of raw materials and labor,” says Van der Welle.

“Clearly the issue today following the pandemic is not demand related, but supply related. This will also trigger more awareness to push the productivity frontier and incentivize capital expenditure.”

Less reliance on labor

The fifth element is the partial substitution from labor to capital in the US against the backdrop of lingering labor shortages.

“A decline in the labor force participation rate shows that people are not quickly returning to the labor force, as they have been disincentivized by the subsidies and pay checks they have gained from the stimulus plans, and/or structural changes in their work/life balance due to the pandemic,” says Van der Welle.

“When the cost of labor becomes more expensive, substituting labor with capital becomes more attractive for employers. Typically, the inflection point for capex intentions becoming positive is when unit labor costs rise by more than 2% year on year, which is the case today.”

Capex will lengthen the earnings cycle

Regarding earnings, there is a significant relationship between capex intentions and productivity, though the lag from intending to invest to actually getting a realized productivity gain is quite long – up to several years.

Higher capex that eventually brings higher productivity growth will sustain the earnings cycle, Van der Welle says. Higher productivity gives corporates more pricing power because they suppress unit labor costs, and that means profit margins can stay elevated for longer.

#### Changing the legal standards of antitrust spills over to crush otherwise surging corporate growth.

Thierer ’21 [Adam; February 25; Senior Research Fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University; The Hill, “Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer,” <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/540391-open-ended-antitrust-is-an-innovation-killer>]

Unfortunately, the calls for more bureaucracy and regulation emanating from all corners of the political world could have an unintended consequence: discouraging the sort of vibrant innovation and consumer choice that made America’s tech companies household names across the globe.

Sen. [Amy Klobuchar](https://thehill.com/people/amy-klobuchar) (D-Minn.) is leading one charge. Klobuchar, who chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, [recently introduced](https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e/1/e171ac94-edaf-42bc-95ba-85c985a89200/375AF2AEA4F2AF97FB96DBC6A2A839F9.sil21191.pdf) the “Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act.” This sweeping measure seeks to expand the powers and budgets of antitrust regulators at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. It also includes new filing requirements and potentially hefty civil fines.

The most important feature is the proposed change to the legal standard by which regulators approve business deals. It would allow the government to stop any deal that creates an “appreciable risk of materially lessening competition,” and it also defines exclusionary behavior as, “conduct that materially disadvantages one or more actual or potential competitors.”

These may sound like simple, semantic tweaks, but – much like some of the other policy ideas currently circulating – they would upend decades of settled law and create a sea change in U.S. antitrust enforcement. This change could undermine business dynamism, innovation and investment in ways that inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses.

Critics of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity by large tech firms include not only Sen. Klobuchar but also Republicans such as Sen. [Josh Hawley](https://thehill.com/people/joshua-josh-hawley) (R-Mo.). Hawley recent [offered an amendment](https://www.axios.com/josh-hawley-big-tech-merger-ban-1467081d-216c-45a2-9d09-9416dfbde330.html) to a budget bill that would preemptively prohibit mergers and acquisitions by dominant online firms. Klobuchar and Hawley believe that M&A skews the market in favor of today’s largest firms, entrenching their market power and discouraging innovation.

History teaches a different lesson. Consider DirecTV and Skype, both once considered innovative market leaders in their respective fields of satellite TV and internet telephony. Both firms stumbled, however, and they might not even be with us today without creative business deals. DirecTV has been partially or fully controlled by Hughes Electronics, News Corp., Liberty Media and now AT&T. Skype has swapped hands multiple times, moving from eBay, to a private investment firm and now to Microsoft.

These were complex deals, and some didn’t work, leading to divestitures. But each was a learning experience that illustrated how dynamic media and technology markets can be with firms constantly searching for value-added arrangements that serve their customers and shareholders. If we make this type of activity presumptively illegal, we’re imagining that government bureaucrats are better suited to make these calls than businesspeople and the consumers who choose whether or not to buy the product.

Worse yet, legal tests like those Klobuchar proposes – “conduct that materially disadvantages potential competitors” – are remarkably open-ended and could be easily abused. The system will be gamed by opponents of deals for business reasons. They will claim that their own failure to attract investors or customers must all be the fault of more creative rivals. That’s a recipe for cronyism and economic stagnation.

Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly unassailable monopolies should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines [proclaimed](https://www.technewsworld.com/story/55185.html) that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and [asked](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/feb/08/business.comment), “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist.

At the same time, pundits [insisted](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-should-pull-the-plug-on-the-iphone) “Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new [corporate “Big Brother”](http://www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=67a5f6a101935b8e3586ca48216d31ba6d4e03de-1612467283-0-AXvbGCtUx-p_N4T-8_2m8OHezQUhQ9kelg9-pVuD6IzKvFfXrllJujU9ERvjqjyIsAeCovUw9bfZqq75_NYasBM87SnQT_027hDJOhjXeowzK1QQH_7vcmr1tS4XgCGC_NNx6UGbAvVgcJNFhSkqkVKKeRJ-BjdDA7Vus-gwmr7wQXcS7KKfTtHyqxdRfureL9alpZHU2IJcbbdYaZpTjTrfcJHCKa8pIZcdiScjaRJmON9X1Ip20Vuv7tyDHbZSvcrn88WrY_9N_qBpKvZhQ4PAe90w5Fx5iHjjNIzoNMKSpToTFGLbPdqawgge9PVubSQbkS7xXDXxCBMA2Sh-Y_U) that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.

Today, we know these tales of the apocalypse ended up instead becoming case studies in the continuing power of “creative destruction.” New innovations and players emerged from many unexpected quarters, decimating whatever dreams of continued domination the old giants once had.

Today’s biggest players face similar pressures, and it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically, not through the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation.

#### Extinction---recovery caps numerous geopolitical crises.

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

## Doctors Adv

### Solvency

#### Expanding the scope is insufficient- agencies will seek weak and ineffective remedies

Khan and Vaheesan, 17 -- New America Open Markets Program fellow

[Lina, and Sandeep, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations counsel, "Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents," Harvard Law & Policy Review, 11 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 235, Spring 2017, Westlaw, accessed 5-24-21, edited for ableist language]

Stronger antitrust rules must be paired with effective remedies in public enforcement actions if markets are to be competitive. Even very strong restrictions on conduct are unlikely to be effective if the subsequent remedies are weak. Legal victories are certain to be pyrrhic when “liability is found; but ineffective remedies are imposed and competitive outcomes are not altered very much.”364 For example, even under a stricter merger enforcement regime, companies may pursue anticompetitive mergers if they need to make only minor concessions to get through the nominally tough merger review process. To promote competitive markets and the citizen interest standard, the antitrust agencies must seek to maintain and restore competitive market structures. In the merger context, an effective approach would mean enjoining mergers in their entirety rather than accepting divestitures or conduct remedies. In monopolization matters, structural remedies must be favored over complex, quasi-regulatory behavioral solutions.

While the agencies wisely prefer divestitures to conduct remedies in the case of horizontal mergers, the defects of this approach--even from an efficiency perspective--are apparent. Retrospective studies suggest that structural remedies often fail to maintain competition.365 A landmark FTC study in 1999 found that, in a quarter of reviewed divestitures, “the buyers [were] \*288 not operating viably in the relevant market”366 and so competition was not preserved following a merger.367

While FTC divestiture remedies may have improved following the study, two spectacular failures in recent years raise continued doubts about their efficacy. In the mergers between Hertz and Dollar Thrifty in 2012 368 and Albertsons and Safeway in 2015 369 the FTC required the merging entities to divest assets to address competition concerns in local markets. In both instances, the acquiring entities proved to be incapable of replacing the lost competition and filed for bankruptcy less than a year after the FTC blessed the divestitures. And in the cruelest of ironies and a stinging rebuke to the FTC, in both instances the merging firms ended up buying back some of the entities originally divested.370

Importantly, neither remedy's failure came as a surprise to observers. In Hertz/Dollar Thrifty, the entity that Hertz divested--Advantage Rent a Car--did not appear to be viable from the beginning. Advantage was stripped of cars and the support of being under the Hertz umbrella.371 A rental car consultant described the divestiture as akin to “taking a two-year old and saying ‘OK, now you've got to go to kindergarten and play Little League.”372 On top of inadequate financial and logistical capabilities, Advantage's new management and ownership appeared to lack the knowhow to run a successful car rental business.373 In the meantime, as Advantage floundered, the Big Three in the car rental market raised prices at the highest \*289 rate since the start of the Great Recession.374 Perversely, Hertz went on to reacquire some of the Advantage locations it had divested.375

The remedy in the Albertsons/Safeway case is arguably even harder to fathom. To allay the FTC's concerns, the merging entities sold 146 Albertsons stores in towns and cities in the Western United States, where they competed with a Safeway, to a small supermarket chain called Haggen.376 Following this acquisition, the number of Haggen stores increased from 18 to 164.377 Even a casual observer could have predicted that Haggen would have great difficulty expanding its storefronts nearly ten-fold in a very short period of time. The skeptics have been proven right. Haggen struggled to integrate the new stores and, despite its reorganization efforts in bankruptcy, may be forced to liquidate.378 Underscoring how the remedy backfired, Albertsons has reacquired a number of the stores it sold through the bankruptcy process.379

Even if divestitures could be perfectly tailored and if they preserved competition in narrow markets in every instance, they would fail to advance the citizen interest standard. As they have in recent decades, large companies would still grow larger through consolidation, notwithstanding minor modifications to address the antitrust agencies' efficiency concerns. Businesses could use their greater size to coordinate with rivals across a number of markets and also to engage in exclusionary conduct to preserve their market power. In addition, their greater size would give them more power over our general political economy--an outcome that the congressmen and senators debating and drafting the antitrust statutes sought to forestall.380

To promote Congress's broad vision of protecting consumers and suppliers, maintaining open markets, and dispersing private power, the antitrust agencies should establish a strong presumption in favor of enjoining mergers in concentrated industries. This remedy would be more effective in ensuring that competition does not wane. As a practical matter, it is not apparent that the antitrust agencies are capable of crafting good remedies--especially given that as the economy becomes more and more concentrated, the number of credible buyers of divested assets steadily diminishes.381 If, for example, Haggen was indeed the most qualified buyer of Albertsons supermarkets \*290 in Western cities for the sake of maintaining competition, it would raise serious doubts about the general pool of capable supermarket operators that are not already oligopolists in their own right. More importantly, the current focus on horizontal market overlaps reflects an unduly narrow conception of competitive harms. Stopping mergers would help maintain market structures that are not only more conducive to protecting consumers, producers, and workers from market power, but would also preserve open markets and prevent excessive concentration of private power in the economy and society.

In addressing monopolization of markets, structural solutions should be favored.382 They allow for a one-time fix and create or restore a market in which multiple firms exist and competition can develop. Conduct remedies, in contrast, may treat only the symptoms of the problematic monopoly,383 and are prone to being incomplete, ambiguous, and vulnerable to evasion.384 Companies subject to these ongoing remedies have a powerful motive to sidestep them, including through the exercise of overt and subtle power over regulators,385 as a means of perpetuating their profitable dominance.386 While the challenges are not necessarily insurmountable, the antitrust agencies and courts are not institutionally well-suited to monitor and enforce complex conduct remedies.387 This task, insofar as it is feasible, is more appropriate for industry regulators and public utility commissions.388

#### Expanding antitrust laws without expanding enforcement capacities fails

**Jones and Kovacic, 20** – Professor of Law at King’s and a solicitor at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP; Professor at George Washington University Law School and director of their Competition Law Center

[Alison Jones and William E. Kovacic, "Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy," SAGE Journals, 3-20-2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0003603X20912884, accessed 7-7-2021]

Measures to expand federal antitrust intervention dramatically—through the prosecution of lawsuits or the promulgation of trade regulation rules—will face arduous opposition from the affected businesses. Assuming that litigation will provide the main method in the coming few years to attack positions of single-firm or collective dominance, the targets of big antitrust cases will marshal the best talent that private law firms, economic consultancies, and academic bodies can offer to oppose the government in court. The defense will benefit from doctrinal principles that generally are sympathetic to dominant firms (again, we assume that legislation to change the doctrinal status quo will not be immediately forthcoming). Beyond a certain point, the addition of new, high stakes cases to the litigation portfolio of public antitrust agencies will create a serious gap between the teams assembled for the prosecution and defense, respectively. Although therefore the public agencies can match the private sector punch for the punch when prosecuting several major de-monopolization cases, when the volume of such cases rises from several to many, the government agencies may have to rely on personnel with considerably less experience to develop and prosecute difficult antitrust cases, seeking powerful remedies upon global giants.

## Trust Adv

### Pharma

#### Big pharma is entering a new age of innovation – Covid proves

**The Economist, 20** [The Economist, "Drug innovation is back in fashion," Economist, 05-23-2020, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/05/23/drug-innovation-is-back-in-fashion, accessed 7-13-2021]

The pandemic has reminded the world of the industry’s strengths—its capacity to innovate and provide drugs on a vast scale. Many of the big firms, such as Johnson & Johnson and Sanofi, are working on covid-19 vaccines and therapies. Scores of smaller companies are at work, too. On May 18th Moderna, an American biotech firm, said that its much-anticipated vaccine has shown positive early results (although some analysts questioned the validity of its tests). AstraZeneca, a big British firm that invests heavily in research and development (r&d), is working on a vaccine with scientists at Oxford University, helped by $1bn of new funding from America’s government. Even before the virus, the industry had started to invest more heavily. In the most recent quarter America’s 30 biggest firms boosted their r&d by a median of 6% year on year. Now medical innovation is back in fashion.

#### Status quo solves – small firms innovating now

**Bulik, 21** – Senior Editor

[Beth Snder, "Big innovation shift to small pharma? Rookies grab lead in annual poll—and look to stay put," FiercePharma, 4-27-2021, https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/big-innovation-shift-to-small-pharma-rookies-grab-lead-annual-poll-and-look-to-stay-put, accessed 7-13-2021]

When it comes to pharma innovation, bigger isn’t always better anymore. Nowhere was that more apparent than in IDEA Pharma’s recent annual roundup of pharma’s best innovators for 2021.

Three smaller pharma companies landed in the top five—Regeneron, Seagen and Incyte—and two had never before cracked the top 30. Two other smaller companies made the top 30 list for the first time: Moderna at No. 20 and BeiGene at No. 27.

Eli Lilly and Roche still took the top two spots, signaling that Big Pharma certainly isn't out of the innovation race. And smaller companies have jumped into the top innovation ranking before, typically on a one-drug success. For example, Alexion was No. 6 last year after its nod for Ultomiris but fell to No. 23 this year.

Big hits do account for some of this year’s success, but there are signs the industry is shifting more permanently.

“I think this year proves you don’t need to be a large player anymore to launch a drug, especially with the more rare and novel formats of drugs,” IDEA Pharma CEO Mike Rea said.

“It’s probably a function of where the industry’s going," Rea added. "Most of the approvals in the U.S. last year weren’t in the top 30 anyway, so I think we’re seeing big companies struggling for having a point rather than just relying on their scale to bring them through.”

Incyte, for instance, had two novel drug approvals, the same as No. 1 Eli Lilly. And Incyte, which landed at No. 5 in the ranking, isn’t empty-handed for future rankings, either. It ranked second on IDEA Pharma’s companion Invention Index, which measures pipeline invention and novelty.

Incyte grew 24% in 2020, partly in thanks to a 15% sales hike for JAK inhibitor Jakafi. But the pharma also nabbed approvals for Monjuvi in lymphoma and Pemazyre for a rare bile duct cancer.

Still on the horizon is an expansion for rheumatoid arthritis drug Olumiant, with partner Eli Lilly, which is gunning for an approval in atopic dermatitis. And Incyte also joined into the COVID-19 race with Jakafi; while the drug didn't meet its statistical endpoint, it did show improvement in severe COVID-19 patients, and Lilly plans to continue working with the FDA on a potential approval.

Eneida Bushi, IDEA Pharma strategy consultant, noted Incyte’s unique position on both indexes, adding “Again, it’s one of those interesting smaller companies that scores high on its pipeline potential, but also its ability to bring drugs to the market successfully."

Moderna is another example of the shift in innovation from Big Pharma. Its COVID-19 vaccine pushed the company's market cap to $67 billion, but, as successful as that one product is, the vaccine essentially served as validation for its mRNA technology and what it can do in the future.

"Moderna was a company waiting for an opportunity,” Rea said. “As their market cap shows, they used 2020 as a proof of concept for everything else they’re planning to do after that.”

Even Regeneron, which straddles the line between large and small pharma, impressed with its robust year. It jumped to No. 3 from No. 10, following up on a similar seven-spot climb from 2019. Its revenue grew 30%, while its R&D spend jumped even more to 36%.

Though its partner drug with Sanofi, Dupixent, led the company's growth and won a new approval—a first for esosinophilic esophagitis—Regeneron’s successful COVID-19 monoclonal antibody cocktail sealed its innovator status. Still up for potential FDA nods are an antibody treatment in advanced multiple myeloma and a priority review for Libtayo in first line non-small cell lung cancer.

The other top five newcomer—oncology specialist Seagen, which shortened its name from Seattle Genetics in 2020—landed on the list at No. 4 with the approval of TYK inhibitor Tukysa and the continuing strength of Adcetris and Padcev.

Seagen also has a whopping nine pipeline programs and has already filed a biologics licensing application along with Genmab for tisotumab vedotin for patients with recurrent or metastatic cervical cancer.

# 2nc

#### CP solves – ensures that doctor shortages are filled as quickly as possible

ina Sawani, 11-10-2021, "Early result acceptance programs could bring innovative change to medical residency applications," University of Michigan, https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/med-u/early-result-acceptance-programs-could-bring-innovative-change-to-medical-residency

To ensure that “match results” did not sway the answers of participants, the team administered the survey before Match Day. “The survey clearly defined ERAP as a ‘binding early decision process’ where students would only apply to a limited number of programs,” said Morgan. “The programs could then make a portion of their residency openings available through this process, with matches announced in September, just before the main match is opened.” Using a Likert scale, each survey recipient was asked to indicate their likelihood of participating in an ERAP as a program staffer or recommending the process to one of their peers as an applicant. In addition, the respondents were asked to make a recommendation regarding their thoughts on the appropriate number of open residency positions within their program or the number of applications submitted by candidates, respectively. “Our results were very telling, in that a majority of the stakeholder respondents said that they would participate in an ERAP, while we also observed increased numbers (in support of ERAPs) among our student respondents,” said Morgan. “The survey data also showed that a proposed ERAP would include three applications per candidate and allow programs to open 25% to 50% of their positions to applicants within the first stage of the match.” Hammoud added that these findings are so significant because they will decrease the financial costs incurred by applicants, while alleviating some of their anxiety and allowing them to focus on their futures as aspiring physicians during their last year before entering their residency program. “The removal of unnecessary applications from competitive candidates would also usher in a more holistic review process for others,” she said. “And we are very excited about what the future holds.”

# Bizcon

#### Business confidence is high.

LBCI ’22 [Leeds Business Confidence Index, a business confidence survey administered by the University of Colorado-Boulder; January 6; Boulder, “The Leeds Business Confidence Index (LBCI) Q1 2022,” <https://www.colorado.edu/business/sites/default/files/attached-files/lbci_q1_2022_final.v2.pdf>]

Business confidence remained elevated ahead of Q1 2022, rising slightly from Q4 2021. All components of the index increased ahead of the first quarter. The index increased 1.9 points from Q4 2021 to Q1 2022 and grew another 1.4 points ahead of Q2 2022. While panelists expressed concerns about inflation, supply chain issues, worker constrains, and COVID-19 variants, they also expressed optimism about increased demand and COVID-19. A vast majority of respondents noted inflation issues impacting their business. More than 68% of respondents expect to increase wages in response to higher inflation, and most do not expect inflation to moderate in the second half of 2022 or in 2023.

## Uniqueness

### 2NC---Uniqueness

#### Businesses are confident about the economy’s future.

LBCI ’22 [Leeds Business Confidence Index, a business confidence survey administered by the University of Colorado-Boulder; January 6; Boulder, “The Leeds Business Confidence Index (LBCI) Q1 2022,” <https://www.colorado.edu/business/sites/default/files/attached-files/lbci_q1_2022_final.v2.pdf>]

Summary – Leaders Remain Optimistic

The LBCI increased from 56.1 in Q4 2021 to 58 ahead of Q1 2022, remaining strongly in positive territory; the overall index posted gains quarter-over-quarter and year-over-year. As well, all six components increased from the prior quarter and prior year. Looking two quarters ahead to Q2 2022, expectations improved further. Coupling the quantitative survey results with the qualitative comments, panelists signaled expectations of a sustained economic recovery.

Figure omitted.

National real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a 2.3% seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) in Q3 2021 according to the third estimate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Personal consumption expenditures increased 2%, and gross private domestic investment increased at an annualized rate of 12.4%; government expenditures advanced 0.9%. The trade deficit increased from Q2 2021 to Q3 2021, growing to $1.3 trillion (annualized average chained dollars). Consensus Forecasts’ economic expectations for real GDP growth in 2021 remained high in December with estimated 2021 growth of 5.6% and projected 2022 growth of 4%.

National and State Economies — Improved Outlook

General state and national economic expectations remained elevated ahead of Q1. State expectations increased from 55.1 ahead of Q4 to 57.6 ahead of Q1 and 59.4 looking out further to Q2 2022. The gap between the state outlook and national outlook widened to 7.2 points ahead of Q1, indicating business leaders’ confidence that the state will outperform relative to the nation. The national index also increased from a negative position ahead of Q4 (48.9) to a positive position (50.4) ahead of Q1 2022 and 55 looking out further to Q2 2022.

### 2NC---Uniqueness---AT: Labor Market

#### The labor market is tight.

Smith ’22 [Noah; January 6; Finance Professor at Stony Brook University; Substack, “The Biden Boom,” https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/the-biden-boom]

The official numbers aren’t in yet, but In the 4th quarter of 2021, the United States economy is believed to have grown by about 5.5% or 6% (annualized rate). That’s a pretty incredible number, when you consider that the consensus forecast for China is only 3.5% in the same quarter. But things get even more impressive when you look at the employment numbers. The unemployment rate probably fell to 4.1% in December — a number below what we used to think to think of as the “natural rate” of unemployment.

Figure omitted.

If you told me in April 2020 that unemployment would be 4.1% by December 2021, I’d have laughed in your face. And yet here we are.

Of course, after the Great Recession, we all got very used to looking past headline unemployment numbers, to see who is actually working. But now when we do that, we see that all the other numbers tell the same story. U6, the broadest measure of unemployment plus underemployment, is down to the level of 2018 or 2006. And my personal favorite labor market indicator, the prime-age employment-to-population ratio, is back to the level of late 2017:

Figure omitted.

Other indicators also show an extremely healthy labor market. While some have interpreted rising quits as a sign of a “Great Resignation”, the truth is that this mostly just reflects job churn; people are quitting in order to get better jobs, because the opportunities are so good. To see that, check out this graph from the Economic Policy Institute, showing that hires are greater than quits pretty much everywhere:

Figure omitted.

And the most amazing thing is that this labor market still has more room to run. The Beveridge Curve — which plots unemployment versus the vacancy rate — shows that even though unemployment is low and falling, the number of job vacancies remains historically high:

Twitter avatar for @Bellmanequation

Noah Williams

@Bellmanequation

• From January-June 2021, the Beveridge curve was ≈ vertical: big increase in job openings with little change in unemployment

• From June-November 2021, the Beveridge curve was ≈ horizontal: fall in unemployment with little change in job openings

bls.gov/charts/job-ope…

Image

January 4th 2022

3 Retweets5 Likes

And for workers at the bottom of the distribution, this red-hot labor market has been raising real wages, even as inflation erodes the pay of the people higher up.

This looks like an economy that’s close to topping out — but growth is still over 5%! Any way you slice it, that’s an economic boom.

### 2NC---Uniqueness---AT: Inflation

#### Inflation is no big deal.

Smith ’22 [Noah; January 6; Finance Professor at Stony Brook University; Substack, “The Biden Boom,” https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/the-biden-boom]

Now, there will be two main objections that people raise to this simple, optimistic story. The first, of course, is inflation; consumer prices have been rising at an annualized rate of somewhere around 6-10%, the fastest since the early 1980s. And of course I’m not going to deny that this is a problem, particularly for the people in the middle and upper classes who are seeing their salaries eroded.

But remember that some degree of inflation is just what we’d expect to see in an economic boom. The old classic theory was that high growth comes with high inflation — like in the late 1960s. That theory has plenty of problems with it, of course. And we all know that the current high inflation isn’t purely a function of a hot economy — it’s also due to supply chain snarls. But some of our inflation is simply due to the fact that people have a lot of money to spend right now.

### Uniqueness---Thumpers---2NC

#### Thumpers supercharge the link---the aff is the ‘millionth pebble,’ blocking water altogether.

Broughel ’17 [James; May 10; Economics PhD from George Mason University, adjunct professor of law at the Antonin Scalia Law School; Regulation and Economic Growth, “How Regulations Enter the Economic System,” Ch. 4, p. 51-52]

One reason the cumulative effect of all regulations together may have the most consequences with respect to growth rates is that new regulations interact with existing ones, resulting in effects larger than the new regulations would create on their own. Consider the simple case where there are only two rules on the books—one old and one new. Both regulations might have an effect on production when acting in isolation, but there is also the potential for an interaction effect between the two regulations once both are in place at the same time.

Interaction effects among regulations have been compared to dropping pebbles in a stream (Mandel and Carew 2013). The first pebble may not slow the flow of water in a noticeable way, but the thousandth pebble might, and the millionth pebble might stop the flow altogether. This example is true despite the fact that the millionth pebble might be of little consequence if it were the first pebble dropped in the water. When hundreds of thousands of requirements are on the books, adding a single new one can produce much larger effects than one would expect from looking at that regulation in isolation.

#### Flip thumpers. Regulations accumulate and multiply.

Coffey ’16 [Bentley, Patrick A. McLaughlin, and Pietro Peretto; April; Visiting Assistant Public Policy Professor at Duke University; Senior Research Fellow Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Economics PhD at Clemson University; Economics Professor at Duke University; Mercatus Center, “The Cumulative Cost of Regulations,” <https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf>]

A key insight of endogenous growth models in general is that the effect of government intervention on economic growth is not simply the sum of static costs associated with individual interventions. One recent proposal regarding the phenomenon of regulatory accumulation reframed this insight with respect to regulation, pointing out that when regulations are created in reaction to major events, “new rules are [placed] on top of existing reporting, accounting, and underwriting requirements. . . . For each new regulation added to the existing pile, there is a greater possibility for interaction, for inefficient company resource allocation, and for reduced ability to invest in innovation. The negative effect on US industry of regulatory accumulation actually compounds on itself for every additional regulation added to the pile” (Mandel and Carew 2013, p. 4).

## Impact---Growth

### Impact---2NC

#### It stops extinction from emerging tech and U.S.-Russia-China war.

Burrows ’16 [Matthew; September 2016; Director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, PhD in European History from the University of Cambridge; Global Risks 2035, “The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order,” Ch. 8, http://espas.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Global\_Risks\_2035\_web\_0922.pdf]

The multilateralist global system that the United States and the West built after the end of the Second World War was premised on an economically strong United States and West. In 1945, the United States was the only victor that was not completely devastated. World War II had brought the country out of the Great Depression, and the US GDP constituted more than 50 percent of the world’s total. Into the twenty-first century, the members of the Group of Seven (G7) were the world’s political and economic heavyweights. It has only been in the past several years that the collective GDP of the developing world—led by China—has surpassed the developed world’s. Even as non-Western powers grow, it is psychologically hard for the West to think about relinquishing its reins.

Demographically, the West has, for a long time, been in the minority. What’s more recent is the aging of the Western population (analyzed in chapter 2), which is already occurring in Japan and Europe, beginning to squeeze the availability of resources for anything but health, social security, and interest payments on debt. Unless healthcare becomes far more efficient, the US economy will be overburdened with healthcare and pension costs as the “baby boomer” generation ages. Healthcare constitutes a whopping 18 percent of the US GDP—significantly more than is the case for other industrialized countries—without necessarily providing better results.

With more going to health and pensions, there will be less capacity for defense and military spending. The United States is the biggest military spender, but China is increasing its portion of worldwide military spending, while the worldwide share of European NATO members is diminishing.

China’s military probably will not rival the United States’ power-projection capabilities even by 2035, but it will have greater anti-access and denial powers. In a military contest, China may never be able to deliver a knockout blow, but it could tarnish the US image of military invincibility in a conventional state-on-state contest held in its region. Equally, a confrontation that results in a Chinese humiliation could set back China’s aspirations for regional leadership, if not trigger a domestic legitimacy crisis for the Communist Party leadership.

Biggest Problem Is Domestic

The biggest psychological blow to ordinary Western citizens has been their sagging standard of living (more analysis in chapter 1). Despite a much better record of overall growth in the United States since the 2008 financial crisis, those with median incomes have taken a hit.

Worrisome for future US growth potential has been the drop in the labor-participation rate, from the 67 percent range before the 2008 financial crisis to 62-63 percent in the years since. The labor-participation rate was destined to drop due to a growing numbers of retirees, but much of the current sharp decrease comes from unskilled males in their prime working years—forties and early fifties—dropping out. Additionally, many younger women are not entering or staying in the job market. Global Trends 2030 looked at two scenarios for future US growth—one in which the United States maintained or slightly increased its average 2.5 percent pre-2008 growth rate, or one in which growth would slow to an average of 1.5 percent a year. In the first, there would still be the global economic shift to China. On the other hand, the 2.5 percent average growth would help boost average living standards, engendering a “feel-good” factor, which would make more Americans interested in reengaging with world issues.91

Given the record of slower growth and labor-force decline since the 2008 financial crisis, the likelihood of the second scenario is increasing. That scenario anticipated lower growth rates—which accelerated declines in average living standards—making it harder to continue trade-liberalization efforts. Indeed, the IMF warned in June 2016 that the United States faces potentially significant longer-term challenges to strong and sustained growth, saying, “concerted policy actions are warranted, sooner rather than later… focusing on the causes and consequences of falling labor force participation, an increasingly polarized income distribution, high levels of poverty, and weak productivity.”92

Moreover, it is not as if traditional US partners—Europe and Japan—are doing much better. Japan and many European countries are aging faster than the United States, eliminating labor-force growth as a driver of future economic growth. Europe’s and Japan’s economic performances have been declining since the 1990s.

In Europe, the public discontent with high unemployment and declining incomes has helped to spur the rise of antiestablishment far-right and populist parties that want to weaken the EU and transatlantic ties. Even in richer European countries, such as Germany, a backlash has been growing against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), out of fear that Europe’s rewards would be meager and European standards would be diluted. McKinsey Global Institute, for example, believes a “return to sustained growth of 2-to-3 percent” is possible for Europe, but would require many politically difficult reforms.93 These include: reducing dependence on imports (much coming from Russia) for crude oil and natural gas; fostering a more vibrant digital economy; increasing workforce participation by the elderly, women, and migrants; and promoting flexibility in labor markets. China now spends a greater share of its GDP on research and development than does Europe. The latest OECD figures show that Europe now spends even less than the rest of the OECD.94

In both the United States and Europe, there is increasing anti-immigrant sentiment despite documented economic benefits from immigration. According to EU Commission Employment Analyst Dr. Jorg Peschner, productivity, by itself, will not be enough to reverse the negative employment trend absent more immigration: “EU’s productivity growth would have to double in order to keep the EU’s economy growing at the same pace as it did before the crisis started.” For employment growth to remain positive as long as possible, improving the labor participation of women, low-educated people, and migrants will also have to be a priority. In the United States, many of the new businesses started every year are started by first- or second-generation immigrants.95

Politically, there has been a large rise in support for right-wing and populist parties in the United States and Europe, undermining traditional parties. The gaps, for example, between the leadership and supporters in the US Republican and UK Tory and Labor Parties have been particularly evident in the selection of Donald Trump as presidential candidate and the June 2016 victory of the “Leave” vote in Britain. Unfortunately, there is no end of economic disruption. The job churn will continue as more and more skills and professions are automated, also increasing the potential for more “losers” from globalization, greater political polarization, and inequality. The increased competitiveness of the developing world with the West is a particular morale buster for Western middle classes who got used to ever-increasing prosperity for themselves and succeeding generations. Adapting to a new norm of economic turbulence—more prevalent in other eras—may be one of the biggest mental hurdles for Westerners. The West is used to thinking of the “Third World,” not home, as the place where economic turmoil happens.

And a Multipolar Financial Architecture, Too

Historically, US and Western power has rested on having a monopoly on reserve currencies and a Western-dominated financial system. In 2035, the dollar will be the biggest reserve currency, but its share of global financial transactions is expected to drop from 60 percent today to 45 percent. The euro will probably remain the second reserve currency, while the Chinese yuan or RMB—which became a part of the IMF benchmark-currency basket in 2015—will become a third reserve currency, accounting for 10 to 15 percent of global finance in two decades’ time.96

The financial architecture will also become more regionalized. The central role played by the financial centers of New York and London will also diminish, and a multitiered financial architecture will develop. Following the UK Brexit, those centers’ share in financial intermediation will decrease, as a second pole of global finance forms in the Eurozone. A third pole will develop in East Asia and Southeast Asia.

Gradually, a growing share of global financial resources will be concentrated in those regional clusters. As with the growth of regional trade, the regional clusters will be more self-encapsulated, spurred by rising domestic demand in China and other developing countries with growing middle classes. With the role of electronic money likely to grow, the traditional banking system will probably also undergo major revision, with potential impacts on governmental powers.

A more multipolar reserve system and regionalized financial architecture should lessen risks and contribute to greater stability. But the large-scale technological innovations—some of which contributed to the 2008 breakdown—will continue, making global finance still volatile. Emerging-market countries with fragmentary regulatory regimes will be particularly prone to suffering financial crises. The aging-population factor also increases risks to public finances. This report anticipates modestly increased volatility, lower than what occurred in the global economy during the 1890s through the 1940s, but higher than in the 1950s and 1960s—more of a continuation of what has been the trend line since the mid-1980s.

Are There Alternative Visions to Western Order?

Four years ago, when Global Trends 2030 was published, the answer was largely no.97 Increasingly, the facts on the ground would suggest otherwise. They do not add up to a cohesive plan to substitute wholesale all Western institutions and practices. However, they clearly indicate that there are some no-go areas, particularly those connected to regime change, democracy promotion, state control over NGOs, and maintaining sovereignty. Russia and China, in particular, see themselves as great powers and, as such, believe they have special rights to dominance in their regions. However, as other powers like India develop, it is likely that they will see themselves as regional powers with inherent prerogatives. It is worth recalling the United States’ expansive Manifest Destiny and nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine, claiming special rights to determine the future of the Western Hemisphere.

The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) has been closely following Beijing’s efforts to build a network of parallel structures to existing international organizations. It has concluded that China “is not seeking to demolish or exit from current international organizations…It is constructing supplementary— in part complementary, in part competitive—channels for shaping the international order beyond Western claims to leadership.”98

As the accompanying chart indicates, China’s shadow network of alternative international structures encompasses everything from financial and economic partnerships (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) to full-blown political groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the BRICS association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.99

Moreover, there is increasing cooperation among many of the emerging powers—beyond just authoritarians—to not just limit what they see as Western meddling in domestic affairs, but to go on the attack globally. According to a recent academic study, the “Big Five” authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela “have taken more coordinated and decisive action to contain democracy on the global level.” They have sought to “alter the democracy and human-rights mechanisms of key rulesbased institutions, including the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and international bodies concerned with the governance of the Internet.”100

How durable are these preferences for nondemocracy and state control? By 2035, if not sooner (in the case of Venezuela), some of the now-authoritarian states could be liberalized, and the perceived threat posed by Western civil-society NGOs may ease. However, China and Russia are more likely than not to want to dominate their regions. Nationalism and democracy have been shown to be highly compatible. It is not clear that an even more powerful China or India would defer to Western leadership of the global order, even if both sides’ values in other areas begin to converge.

What Kind of Post-Western World? Clearly, there is a need to plan for a world that will not have the West as its big economic powerhouse—a prospect hard for Western elites and publics to conceive of, despite a decade or more of publicity about the “rise of the rest.” According to a recent survey, Europeans and Americans are more comfortable with each other than they are with anybody else. Although a majority of Europeans said, in the most recent German Marshall Fund transatlantic-trends polling, that they would like to see their country take an approach more independent from the United States, both Americans and Europeans still prefer each other over more Russian or Chinese leadership in the world.

The Obama administration—considered among the most multilateralist of recent administrations— campaigned hard in 2015 to convince Europeans not to join China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). It was as if the United States was against any governance structure not “made in the USA,” even when those running the AIIB have made clear their intentions of operating with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

More and more, the talk among Western elites is about locking in as much as possible the status quo, which favors the West, so that it will be harder for the newcomers to overcome. The TPP was sold as a way to set the rules before China gains much more power. A former Obama administration official advised that now might be the best time to undertake UN Security Council reform, before China and other uncooperative powers become more powerful. “A new US administration may be able to advance a proposal to address the Security Council’s anachronistic makeup while perpetuating a council that Washington can work with.”101

For Westerners, the challenge will be to plan for a future that will not be solely run by them, but which they can live with. Handovers have been historically difficult and fraught—more often than not, decided by bloody contests. One could envisage different scenarios, some already described in the earlier chapter on conflict, of military contests between the United States and China, or the United States and China with Russia, or the United States with NATO against Russia. Without delivering a knockout blow by one side or the other, these contests would most likely pit West against East, creating something akin to a new Cold War. Even if there were a knockout blow by the United States against China, it is hard to imagine a defeated China deferring permanently to the West. Its population has been imbued with such a narrative about the injustices by the West against China that any defeat or setback would be confirmation that the United States and West are dead set against a rising China.

Perhaps the most harmful effect of such a contest would be to convince both sides that neither is trustworthy. For the non-West, it would confirm the suspicion that the West does not want to relinquish its leadership position. For the West, it would make it harder to ever reach out and help establish a truly global system.

Need for a Second-Generation US and Western Leadership Model

War is not, and should not be, inevitable as the West struggles with the growing clout of China and other developing states on the world stage. Unlike during other transitions, the tools exist for ensuring more peaceful outcomes. They will require Western acquiescence to greater roles for the developing world to set and implement new rules of the road for the international order. A key feature of the post-1945 US design for the world order is its multilateralist structures. Many of these operate below most people’s radar. This plumbing of the international system has enabled the daily functioning of globalization. To keep it viable, China, as well as other developing countries, must be accorded more representation. There are too many long-term risks involved, for example, in China having only the equivalent of France’s voting rights in the IMF, when it is the first or second economic power in the world. This is how resentments are nurtured—all the more dangerous in China’s case because of its underlying “century of humiliation” mental complex.

As emerging technologies come online, the lack of a truly global institutional framework could be particularly dangerous. Assuring the future security of the Internet is particularly important in this regard, because all the new emerging technologies—bio, 3D printing, robotics, big data—take for granted a secure, global Internet. Everyone loses if cyber crime and cyber terrorism undermine the Internet. In the worstcase scenarios, in which cyber crime proliferates or strong national borders fragment the Internet, an Atlantic Council study, as mentioned, found that the economic costs could be as much as $90 trillion out to 2030, in addition to the risk of open conflict.102

Besides bringing the emerging powers into leadership roles in the panoply of multilateral institutions, the United States will need to temper its often “exemptionalist” stance to ensure the survival of the multilateralist order. According to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Patrick Stewart, a prominent scholar of global governance, one of the persistent paradoxes of the post-1945 decades has been that the “United States is at once the world’s most vocal champion of a rules-based international order and the power most insistent on opting out of the constraints that it hopes to see binding on others.”103 No country has the networks and connections that the United States does, but the system is now polycentric, rather than unipolar, and others resent the “exceptional” privileges that the United States claims. The Global Trends works have talked about the need for a new model of US global leadership. The United States needs to be guiding the international system as a “first among equals,” and willing to play by its own rules. Paradoxically, there is likely to be no vibrant global-governance system without US and Western leadership, but too much domineering behavior could doom it.

Even if the United States adapted its global role, this is not to say that the tensions and differences with many emerging powers would all disappear, or that the governance system would function seamlessly. In addition to the growing number of new state actors, the increasing importance of nonstate actors adds a new complexity to the functioning of global institutions. Moreover, there are clear-cut differences between the West and emerging powers on values-based issues, such as democracy promotion and the responsibility to protect. Many developing-country publics still resent Western colonialism and equate any intrusion with past historical wrong. They point to the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya, for example, as cover for the Western goal of regime change. Hence, the UN Security Council failure to stop the fighting in Syria, with more than two hundred thousand killed and 7.6 million displaced. Russia and China want to make a stand against the United States and the West getting their way and ousting the Assad regime. On the other hand, the lack of a solution smacks more of anarchy than global governance. Certainly, it shows one of the gaps that remains, and likely will remain, limiting global governance because of differences in values.

The speed with which new technologies are coming online and becoming an important political, military, and economic tool—for both good and bad—carries big risks for global governance. Stewart Patrick lists four potential new technologies that “cry out for regulation”: geoengineering, drones, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology. Without some setting of rules for their operation, there is the risk of major disruptions, if not catastrophes, stemming from their abuse. The recent advances in synthetic biology lower the bar to abuse by amateurs and terrorists alike, forever affecting human DNA. Geoengineering involves planetary-scale interventions that could interfere with complex climatic systems.

However cumbersome, politically unpopular, and ineffective at times, there is little alternative to increased global cooperation if one does not want to see higher risks of conflict and economic degradation. Without some sort of bolstered global governance, the West would end up with less sovereignty in a “dog-eat-dog” world, in which it was increasingly in the minority. But can the United States and the West rise to the challenge of investing in a global-governance system that will not always favor their interests on every issue? Historically, the United States could be especially generous because it was on top of the world in about everything after the Second World War. Europeans came to truly believe in pooling sovereignty and joint governance after centuries of internecine conflict. The tough economic times at home have seen US and European publics become distrustful of overarching multilateral institutions, believing the will of the United States or individual European countries will not be served. It is oftentimes easier for political leaders to fall in with the public mood rather than display leadership that might appear to work against it.

#### Every hotspot explodes.

Lewis ’18 [Patricia; November 10; Research Director for International Security at Chatham House, PhD in Nuclear Physics from Birmingham University, Former Deputy Director and Scientist-in-Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Former Monterey Institute of International Studies, Former Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Former Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, Graduated in Physics from Manchester University; World Economic Forum, “How to Prevent World War 3,” <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/how-to-prevent-world-war-3>]

Since the ‘war to end all wars’ − as H G Wells so wrongly predicted a century ago − the world has seen the ‘peace to end all peace’ lead to the horrors of the second world war, proxy wars through the Cold War and, today, violent conflicts that increasingly affect civilians disproportionately and cross the red lines laid by the laws of armed conflict. The machinery of war and the available firepower has increased dramatically. The risks of a third world war are enormous. If we add in all the means and methods of warfare − conventional, nuclear, cyber, drones, and so on − we have the military potential to destroy ourselves entirely.

Violence is raging in the Middle East, Europe and Russia are poised on the edge of conflict over Ukraine, the United States is once more engaged in military action in Iraq and, as NATO pulls out, Afghanistan is vulnerable. Other flashpoints over disputed islands in the South China Sea, tensions on the Korean peninsula and over Kashmir are just some of the easily identified points of escalation.

In the past 100 years, we have, however, learned a great deal about how to prevent conflict. After the Second World War, we established the United Nations with the primary purpose of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The European Union grew over decades from a trade treaty to an organization that won the Nobel Peace Prize for its part in transforming Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace. NATO has had its part to play in shoring up the transatlantic alliance that bonded many European countries in a common cause. Today war between Germany and France is almost impossible to imagine.

Other regional organizations have been established in Africa, Asia, the South Pacific and the Americas. International bodies have been established to implement disarmament and security treaties and civil society expertise has been channeled through universities and think tanks − including Chatham House, conceived in 1919 with a view to preventing future wars.

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 254 armed conflicts have been fought since 1946 of which 114 are classed as wars (defined as more than one thousand battle-related deaths per annum). Since the end of the Cold War, the numbers of armed conflicts have dropped dramatically. Of the 33 armed conflicts listed in 2013, only seven were classed as wars – a 50% reduction since 1989.

Many factors have supported the reduction in armed conflicts including the withering of proxy wars, UN sponsored peace processes and economic development. Research by the Human Security Report demonstrates that peace negotiations and cease-fire agreements reduce violent conflict even when they fail.

Six peace agreements were signed in 2013 and four were agreed in 2012. Over recent years, despite common perceptions, we do seem to have learned how to create, keep and enforce the peace.

The laws of armed conflict and human rights laws along with the international criminal court, war crime tribunals, economic and military sanctions and domestic justice commissions serve to protect civilians. Although nuclear weapons possession or use, outlawed for most countries, are yet to be globally forbidden, international law has proscribed the possession and use of devastating weapons systems such as chemical and biological weapons, antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions and blinding lasers.

Academic disciplines that study war and peace have developed a rich body of research that helps us understand how wars start and how they can be prevented or ended. No approach or system is perfect, of course, but we understand how resource scarcity, environmental change, economic stress, refugee flows and racism all fuel the engendering of conflict. We understand the importance of history and culture, the role of gender and the ways in which different political systems exacerbate or diminish the risks of conflict.

In a study for the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), Chatham House and FRIDE predicted that the world in 2030 will be more fragile and governments and international institutions will struggle to cope with the twin trends of increased interdependence and greater fragmentation. Most significantly, we realized that the risks of inter-state wars are rising and a major inter-state war cannot be ruled out in the near future.

In the lead up to the First World War, many foolishly imagined that Europe was ‘too civilized’ to go to war. Prior to the Second World War people hoped that the aggression from Nazi Germany could be contained. In so many cases of war, we tend to be overly optimistic about the length of time (‘we’ll be home by Christmas’), the scale and the outcome of the conflict.

It is time that we put aside complacency and become more realistic about war and peace and ourselves. We know a great deal about how to prevent war. We owe it to all others who sacrificed their lives and families to put into action all that we have learned and ensure peace in Europe, the Middle East and Asia for forthcoming generations. Otherwise, there will be few left to hear our excuses.

### Impact---LIO---2NC

#### Slow growth undermines the rules-based order.

Haas 17 [Richard; January 10; President of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan; Penguin Press, “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order,” Print]

A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe.

It will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems.

Another reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges.

Up to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter.

When it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3

Earlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful.

The most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4

#### Extinction from rogue tech, bioweapons, and climate change.

Harari ’18 [Yuval; September 26; Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; "We need a post-liberal order now," https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now]

If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest.

In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas.

The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses.

Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations.

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians.

This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly.

But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?”

Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game.

Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.

An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”

Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”.

The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans.

Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world.

This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI.

In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

# Case

#### Pandemics won’t cause human extinction

Sebastian **Farquhar 17**. Director at Oxford's Global Priorities Project, Owen Cotton-Barratt, a Lecturer in Mathematics at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, John Halstead, Stefan Schubert, Haydn Belfield, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, 01-23-17, "Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance", GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

### 2nc at: disease

#### No disease impact:

#### 1---Empirical record---out of 833 species extinctions, only 4% were disease, and were all weak and localized species – none were globally dispersed or had capacity to resist like humans

#### 2---burnout---if a pathogen is highly lethal, it kills the host before it has time to spread---creates evolutionary pressure towards less lethal diseases and caps existential risk

#### ---that’s Farquhar

#### It would also have to be completely impentrable to vaccines and immunity---both extremely unlikely, and if true thumps aff solvency

#### Their ev assumes a level of virulence that has literally never occurred

Wendy **Orent 15**, anthropologist and freelance science writer whose work has appeared in The Washington Post, The LA Times, The New Republic, Discover, and The American Prospect, instructor in science journalism @ Emory, Ignore predictions of lethal pandemics and pay attention to what really matters, LA Times, 1/3/15, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-orent-pandemic-hysteria-20150104-story.html

Prophets of doom have been telling us for decades that a deadly new pandemic — of bird flu, of SARS or MERS coronavirus, and now of Ebola — is on its way. Why are we still listening? If you look back at the furor raised at many distinguished publications — Nature, Science, Scientific American, National Geographic — back in, say, 2005, about a potential bird flu (H5N1) pandemic, you wonder what planet they were on. Nature ran a special section titled — “Avian flu: Are we ready?” — that began, ominously, with the words “Trouble is brewing in the East” and went on to present a mock aftermath report detailing catastrophic civil breakdown. Robert Webster, a famous influenza virologist, told ABC News in 2006 that “society just can't accept the idea that 50% of the population could die. And I think we have to face that possibility.” Public health expert Michael T. Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, at a meeting in Washington of scientists brought together by the Institute of Medicine, warned in 2005 that a post-pandemic commission, like the post-9/11 commission, could hold “many scientists … accountable to that commission for what we did or didn't do to prevent a pandemic.” He also predicted that we could be facing “three years of a given hell” as the world struggled to right itself after the deadly pandemic. And Laurie Garrett, author of what must be the urtext for pandemic predictions, her 1994 book “The Coming Plague,” intoned in Foreign Affairs that “in short, doom may loom.” Although she followed that with “But note the may,” the article went on to paint a terrifying picture of the avian flu threat nonetheless. And such hysteria still goes on: Whether it's over the MERS coronavirus, a whole alphabet of chicken flu viruses, a real but not very deadly influenza pandemic in 2009, or a kerfuffle like the one in 2012 over a scientist-crafted ferret flu that also was supposed to be a pandemic threat. Along the way, virologist Nathan Wolfe published “The Viral Storm: the Dawn of a New Pandemic Age,” and David Quammen warned in his gripping “Spillover” that some new animal plague could arise from the jungle and sweep across the world. And now there's Ebola. Osterholm, in a widely read op-ed in the New York Times in September, wrote about the possibility that scientists were afraid to mention publicly the danger they discuss privately: that Ebola “could mutate to become transmissible through the air.” “The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has the potential to alter history as much as any plague has ever done,” he wrote. And Garrett wrote in Foreign Policy, “Attention, World: You just don't get it.” She went on to say, “Wake up, fools,” because we should be more frightened of a potential scenario like the one in the movie “Contagion,” in which a lethal, fictitious pandemic scours the world, nearly destroying civilization. But there were fewer takers this time. Osterholm's claims about Ebola going airborne were discounted by serious scientists, and Garrett seemingly retracted her earlier hysteria about Ebola by claiming that, after all, evolution made such spread unlikely. The scientific world has changed since 2005. Now, most scientists understand that there are significant physical and evolutionary barriers to a blood- and fluid-borne virus developing airborne transmission, as Garrett has acknowledged. Though Ebola virus has been detected in human alveolar cells, as Vincent Racaniello, virologist at Columbia University, explained to me, that doesn't mean it can replicate in the airways enough to allow transmission. “Maybe … the virus can get in, but can't get out. Like a roach motel,” wrote Racaniello in an email. H5N1, we understand now, never went airborne because it attached only to cell receptors located deep in human lungs, and could not, therefore, be coughed or sneezed out. SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, caused local outbreaks after multiple introductions via air travel but spread only sluggishly and mostly in hospitals. Breaking its chains of transmission ended the outbreak globally. There probably will always be significant barriers preventing the easy adaptation of an animal disease to the human species. Furthermore, Racaniello insists that there are no recorded instances of viruses that have adapted to humans, changing the way they are spread. So we need to stop listening to the doomsayers, and we need to do it now. Predictions of lethal pandemics have — since the swine flu fiasco of 1976, when President Ford vowed to vaccinate “every man, woman and child in the United States” — always been wrong. Fear-mongering wastes our time and our emotions and diverts resources from where they should be directed — in the case of Ebola, to the ongoing tragedy in West Africa. Americans have all but forgotten about Ebola now, because most people realize it isn't coming to a school or a shopping mall near you. But Sierra Leoneans and Liberians go on dying.

#### Err against disease impacts---tech and bias ensure they’re overestimated

**Pinker 18** Steven Arthur Pinker is a Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, Professor at Harvard University. [Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Viking, Penguin Group]//BPS

And crucially, advances in biology work the other way as well: they also make it easier for the good guys [public protectors] (and there are many more of them) to identify pathogens, invent antibiotics that overcome antibiotic resistance, and rapidly develop vaccines.63 An example is the Ebola vaccine, developed in the waning days of the 2014–15 emergency, after public health efforts had capped the toll at twelve thousand deaths rather than the millions that the media had foreseen. Ebola thus joined a list of other falsely predicted pandemics such as Lassa fever, hantavirus, SARS, mad cow disease, bird flu, and swine flu.64 Some of them never had the potential to go pandemic in the first place because they are contracted from animals or food rather than in an exponential tree of person-to-person infections. Others were nipped by medical and public health interventions. Of course no one knows for sure whether an evil genius will someday overcome the world’s defenses and loose a plague upon the world for fun, vengeance, or a sacred cause. But journalistic habits and the Availability and Negativity biases inflate the odds, which is why I have taken Sir Martin up on his bet. By the time you read this you may know who has won.65

# 1nr

## T – business practices

### ‘Anticompetitive’

#### ‘Anticompetitive’ means centralizing market power to limit competition.

Gavil ’17 [Andrew I, Jonathan B Baker, William Kovacic, and Joshua D Wright; Professor at the Howard University School of Law and Senior of Counsel at Crowell & Moring LLP; Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, a commissioner of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission from 2006 to 2011; Research Professor of Law at American University, former Director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission; the Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute, professor of law at George Mason University, commissioner of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission from 2013 to 2015; third edition published 2017; Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts, and Problems in Competition Policy, “Defining Competition Policy for a Global Economy,” Ch. 1, p. 40]

a. What Do We Mean by "Anticompetitive" Conduct?

"Anticompetitive" cannot be defined without answering the question: "What goals do the antitrust laws intend to promote?" The predominance of economic analysis in the United States necessarily creates a link between "anticompetitive" and economic goals. Anticompetitive means conduct likely to lead to the creation, maintenance, or enhancement of market power, or that involves the actual exercise of market power. As the Coffee Shop hypothetical showed, "market power" in turn refers to the ability to raise price by reducing output, or to limit some other dimension of competition. It is typically associated with a departure from the conditions necessary for the optimal functioning of a market: a sufficient number of buyers or sellers, relatively easy conditions of entry and exit, or readily accessible information on market conditions.

#### Anticompetitive refers to price fixing and such.

FTC ’13 [Federal Trade Commission; carbon dated November 19, 2013; “Anticompetitive Practices,” https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices]

Anticompetitive Practices

The FTC takes action to stop and prevent unfair business practices that are likely to reduce competition and lead to higher prices, reduced quality or levels of service, or less innovation. Anticompetitive practices include activities like price fixing, group boycotts, and exclusionary exclusive dealing contracts or trade association rules, and are generally grouped into two types:

agreements between competitors, also referred to as horizontal conduct

monopolization, also referred to as single firm conduct

The FTC generally pursues anticompetitive conduct as violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”

### ‘Antitrust’ = Money---2AC

#### ‘Antitrust’ governs how firms make money.

Crane ’14 [Daniel; February 7; Law Professor at the University of Michigan, Antitrust (Aspen Treatise), “Foundational Economic Assumptions,” Ch. 1, p. 3]

Put simply, antitrust is the body of rules about how individuals and companies (we'll call them "firms" since that sounds econ-y; the Europeans call them "undertakings") are allowed to compete in order to make money. A basic assumption of the U.S. economic system is that competition is beneficial and that firms should behave "competitively," meaning that they should neither coddle up to competitors nor try to push them out of the market, but rather steer to some middle ground called "competition on the merits." In this introductory chapter, we examine the economic foundations of this assumption.

### ‘Antitrust Laws’ = Prohibitions---2NC

#### Antitrust law prohibits anti-competitive practices.

Georgetown ’20 [Georgetown’s International and Foreign Competition Law Research Guide; last updated December 8; Georgetown Law Library, “Introduction,” https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/intlAntitrustLaw]

Competition law, known as antitrust law in the U.S., seeks to maintain the integrity of the marketplace by prohibiting anti-competitive practices and by subjecting corporate mergers and acquisitions to regulatory review if they have the potential to significantly reduce competition. Historically, competition law developed and evolved almost exclusively within the jurisdictional boundaries of individual nation states. More recently, the growing influence of multinational business enterprises has led to a corresponding increase in bilateral and regional cooperation among national competition authorities.

### ‘Private Sector’---Companies

#### The ‘private sector’ means private companies.

Black’s Law ’13 [The Law Dictionary features Black's Law Dictionary; carbon dated March 2, 2013; Second Edition Online, “Private Sector” <https://thelawdictionary.org/private-sector/>]

What is PRIVATE SECTOR?

An industry that is composed of private companies. The corporate sector and the personal sector are encompassed in the private sector and they are responsible for the allocation of the majority of resources within the economy.

### AT: We meet

#### We meet – ACGME which runs and controls the Match is Private Sector

ACGME 99 (Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, “1999 Annual Report”, 1999, https://www.acgme.org/globalassets/PDFs/an\_1999AnnRep.pdf)

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education is responsible for evaluating and accrediting residency programs in the United States. We are a private-sector council operating under the aegis of five medical organizations.

Most importantly we act as a catalyst, bringing together knowledgeable healthcare practitioners, educators and administrators to resolve critical issues concerning graduate medical training.

These volunteers who participate in our Residency Review Committees are key to the efficacy of our process. Through their work we directly influence the quality of graduate medical education, the quality of healthcare institutions and, ultimately, the quality of medicine in America. Because of them the ACGME is improving the pattern of medical education and the course of patient care.

## T – core